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Abstract
The effectiveness of fiscal policy to influence vehicle purchases for emissions reductions in private passenger road
transport depends on its ability to incentivise consumers to make choices oriented towards lower emissions vehicles.
However, car purchase choices are known to be strongly socially determined, and this sector is highly diverse due to
significant socio-economic differences between consumer groups. Here, we present a comprehensive dataset and analysis of
the structure of the 2012 private passenger vehicle fleet-years in six major economies across the World (UK, USA, China,
India, Japan and Brazil) in terms of price, engine size and emissions distributions. We argue that choices and aggregate
elasticities of substitution can be predicted using this data, enabling to evaluate the effectiveness of potential fiscal and
technological change policies on fleet-year emissions reductions. We provide tools to do so based on the distributive
structure of prices and emissions in segments of a diverse market, both for conventional as well as unconventional engine
technologies. We find that markets differ significantly between nations, and that correlations between engine sizes,
emissions and prices exist strongly in some markets and not strongly in others. We furthermore find that markets for
unconventional engine technologies have patchy coverages of varying levels. These findings are interpreted in terms of
policy strategy.
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1. Introduction
Transport generates 5.3 Gt out of 32.7 Gt of CO2 of
global fuel combustion greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
contributing to climate change, and over 30% of total emis-
sions annual growth (IEA, 2013). The current trend in
global emissions is leading the world towards global warm-
ing exceeding 4◦C, with the most important component
emitted by the electricity sector, transport coming second
(IPCC, 2014). Transport is not currently highly regulated
for emissions, and consumer preferences with increasing
income drives choices towards increasingly carbon intense
engines (e.g. Gallachoir et al., 2009, Zachariadis, 2013).2
The lack of clear policy direction in the sector may be re-
lated to a lack of understanding of the impact of policies
aiming at incentivising consumer choice (He and Bandi-
vadekar, 2011).
The fuel efficiency of the car fleet depends directly on its
composition of engine types and sizes. In other emissions
intensive sectors such as industry, technologies of the same
type (e.g. boilers, blast furnaces, power plants) differ mod-
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2According to our data, this is also true in the UK.
estly predominantly due to vintage.3 The transport sector,
however, features a very wide continuous array of possible
fuel efficiencies (spanning a factor of 3-4, see data below),
that do not depend as strongly on the state of technol-
ogy and age of cars as it does on socio-economic charac-
teristics of owners. As demonstrated by McShane et al.
(2012), vehicle choices strongly relate to social groups,
and thus existing socio-economic differences are reflected
in the types of vehicles that consumers purchase, consis-
tent with socio-anthropological theory (Douglas and Ish-
erwood, 1979). We ask two questions here: do different
markets respond differently to policy instruments? Is it
possible to obtain quantitative insight on the effectiveness
of proposed policies using market research methods?
Cars typically survive in the fleet for around 12 years.4
The carbon intensity of the private vehicle fleet can be
reduced by influencing vehicle purchase choices in two dif-
ferent ways:5 by improving the average fuel economy of
the new fleet-year (i.e. new models) with conventional
3By vintage we mean different variants of the same technologies
of different ages, variations that stem from the gradual incorporation
of particular innovations over time.
4The life expectancy of cars in the UK is 12 years, as calculated
by the authors using a survival analysis with data from the DVLA
(2012a) data, unpublished.
5Emissions can also be reduced by reductions of car use, for in-
Preprint submitted to Environmental Research Letters May 5, 2015
engine technology, or by gradually replacing conventional
combustion engines by hybrid and electric systems. It is
clear that comprehensive emissions reduction policy must
include coordinated demand-pull and supply-push policies;
however, in the short term, it is policies affecting consumer
choice that have the most impact, since it takes years to
change production lines and supply chains of manufactur-
ers, while sales can change overnight. Here, we focus on
demand-pull policies that affect consumer choice.
Potentials for efficiency improvements in transport have
been widely explored (IEA, 2012, IPCC, 2014, WEC,
2009). In energy-environment policy modelling research,
‘representative’ vehicles are most of the time used, with
cost-optimisation frameworks (e.g. McCollum et al., 2014,
Takeshita, 2012, van der Zwaan et al., 2013), a proce-
dure that is, as we show here, insufficiently rich in socio-
economic patterns, while the optimisation of cost driving
agent choice is contradicted by empirical work (McShane
et al., 2012). It is also not clear that evaluating the aver-
age willingness to pay for higher fuel efficiency is feasible or
even insightful in a highly diverse sector where prices span
an order of magnitude following the income distribution
(see below), and the literature is not unanimous on any
value (Anderson et al., 2011, Gallagher and Muehlegger,
2011, Greene, 2010). A more promising approach appears
to be to use marketing research, where the likely response
of consumers to policies is inferred from the structure of
the market itself (as in He and Bandivadekar, 2011), and
this approach naturally introduces socio-economic distri-
butions.
In this paper, we explore the emissions, technical
and economical characteristics and potential for emis-
sions reductions of car markets in six major representative
economies of the World: the United Kingdom, the United
States, China, India, Japan and Brazil. These markets
possess very different characteristics that are the result of
different histories of policy and regulations, but also differ-
ent socio-economic characteristics of their populations as
well as different cultures. We show that, even with highly
globalised car manufacturers, the distribution of car pur-
chases and their fuel efficiencies have radically different
characteristics in different markets. We calculate the ef-
fectiveness of emissions reduction policies through vehicle
choice in terms of emissions reductions per unit tax, ap-
plied on the price of vehicles or fuels. This is compared to
the effectiveness of policy for technological change. This
leads to two considerations: firstly, different car markets
may require different policies for effective emissions reduc-
tions. Secondly, differences in market characteristics be-
tween countries show comparatively what may be realisti-
cally achievable elsewhere with policy. Details of calcula-
tions are given in the Supplementary Information (SI).
stance with fuel taxes, involving possible transport mode or lifestyle
changes, not the subject of this paper.
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Figure 1: Comparison between the UK income distribution in
kUSD/year after tax (obtained from UKDWP, 2013) and the dis-
tribution of vehicle prices after tax for vehicles purchased in the UK
in 2012 (this study, using data from DVLA (2012a) and Car Pages
(2012), see section 3). The vehicle price distribution population (the
y scaling) is scaled by a per capita vehicle ownership factor of 0.44
(to convert units between per vehicle owner and per capita), which
corresponds to about 28.3 million vehicles owned by 63.9 million
persons in 2012 (DVLA, 2012a). The two distributions are likely
connected.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Theory for car purchase choice
McShane et al. (2012) makes a remarkable demonstra-
tion, using correlations spatially resolved using postcode
data, that vehicle purchases in the USA are visually influ-
enced by previous purchases of similar vehicles locally, but
not by purchases that happen at distances where visual in-
fluence is weak. This takes place within geographical areas,
social identity groups, and within vehicle types and price
tiers. This work provides strong evidence of how vehicle
choices, determined within social groups, take place within
restricted subsets the vehicle market in specific price seg-
ments.
This can be directly observed using socio-economic dis-
tribution data. Figure 1 shows the 2012 distribution of in-
come for the whole UK population (from UKDWP, 2013),
along with the 2012 UK distribution of car purchase prices
(this work, see below) multiplied by average car ownership.
Both datasets are well described by lognormal distribu-
tions and a close relationship is observed between their
scaling parameters,6 suggesting a likely proportional re-
lationship. This indicates that particular socio-economic
groups, on average, purchase vehicles of similar prices.7
6The ratio between their mean and their standard deviation or
median is nearly the same.
7Note that the strength of this correlation and its scaling is found
2
Based on this evidence, here we infer that car buyers
seek to display their social identity, and thus social group
characteristics, when purchasing a vehicle, an assertion
supported by socio-anthropological theory (the anthropol-
ogy of consumption, seminal work by Douglas and Isher-
wood, 1979), principles generally accepted in marketing
research. Following the reasoning of Douglas and Isher-
wood (1979), while all passenger vehicles are built for the
purpose of transporting persons, they are marketed for
particular social groups at particular prices that match
their willingness to pay, and these prices also restrict ac-
cess to other social groups. The price one is able to pay
for a vehicle may be a particularly important channel for
the communication of one’s social identity, and, as emerges
from figure 1, appears to be a good indicator of one’s dis-
posable income.
The diversity of social groups within a nation therefore
strongly influences the diffusion of innovations in the pri-
vate transport fleet. Formally, the breadth of consumer
diversity determines the elasticities of technology substitu-
tion, an assertion that is best understood using discrete
choice theory (for instance in Ben-Akiva and Lerman,
1985). This assertion is consistent with classical diffusion
theory (Rogers, 2010), in which the diversity of consumers
determine the scaling of the typical S-shaped profile of dif-
fusion. It also follows from evolutionary economics, where
technology diversity continually increases to ever better
match evolving consumer tastes.
2.2. Theory for evaluating the effectiveness of policy
Emissions reduction policies targeting private vehicle
choices have an effectiveness that depends on the struc-
ture of local vehicle markets.8 Intuitively, one expects that
fuel efficiencies decrease with increasing levels of luxury.
As we find here, however, prices do not always scale with
emissions, and we describe below the implications to the
response of consumers to policy-making.
Vehicles with large engine displacements have in gen-
eral higher torque and power (for a review of data see
WEC, 2009). For this enhanced power, more fuel (energy)
is used and therefore, for any carbon-based fuel, higher
power means higher emissions per kilometre travelled.9
to vary across the world, where in some countries, the importance of
vehicle purchases relative to other expenditures differ. In particular,
in Japan, the car is losing its significance as an identity symbol and
expenditure, and the relationship between income and vehicle price
is comparatively weakened (see the data in JAMA, 2013).
8By this we mean markets for new vehicles, since the sale of sec-
ond hand vehicles does not change fleet emissions, unless they are
scrapped before the end of their statistical lifetime, e.g. with a ded-
icated scrapping policy.
9Two aspects of driving behaviour predominantly underlie a de-
mand for higher power. For the same travel itinerary, (1) higher
constant speeds (wind resistance increases faster than linearly with
speed, which thus requires more energy per kilometre the faster the
vehicle travels). (2) higher acceleration (requires more energy since
energy losses are proportionally higher at higher engine revolutions
required for higher acceleration).
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of the effectiveness of fiscal poli-
cies based on emissions in the case where there is (a.) a strong
correlation between emissions and vehicle price and where (b.) there
is no clear correlation. Blue lines represent linear regressions. With
a tax that depends on rated emissions (not necessarily proportional),
points in the graph are moved to the left (purple arrows). Possible
reactions of consumers changing vehicle choice in order to counteract
price changes are suggested with green arrows. In (c.) we illustrate
the effectiveness of technological change policies given of a fictitious
alternative technology with limited market coverage, where a subsidy
is applied.
We explore this relationship below; even though signifi-
cant amounts of energy may be used in vehicles for other
purposes than movement (e.g. air conditioning, electron-
ics), we find that a relationship between emissions and
engine size is always measurable, and it is linear.
Vehicles with larger engine displacements are generally
thought more luxurious and expensive than vehicles with
small economical engines. This, however, is not always
true and, as we find below, depends on particular vehi-
cle markets. As we show below, when it exists, it is log-
linear.2 Therefore, whether emissions, or the fuel economy,
are functionally related in any particular way with vehicle
price depends on these two relationships: between emis-
sions and engine size, and between engine size and price.
2The log of the price is a linear function of engine size.
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When it exists, it is also of the log-linear type.
The effectiveness of taxes or subsidies applied on vehi-
cle properties such as engine size or emissions corresponds
to their ability to generate substitutions between avail-
able vehicle models in order to achieve reductions in the
emissions of new vehicles. We show here that at the aggre-
gate level, the effectiveness depends on the structure of the
market and on whether a relationship between emissions
and price exists. If a relationship exists, the effectiveness
is closely related to its correlation parameters. If no re-
lationship exists, the aggregate outcome of fiscal policies
may or may not turn out to match what was expected
in their design, and high levels of uncertainty remains.
Given the log-linear structure of the market, an emissions
reduction tax on the purchase price that produces a non-
negligible incentive across the spectrum of vehicles requires
a fee that increases at least proportionally to the emissions
rating. When proportional, it is consistent with the ‘pol-
luter pays’ principle. Note, however, that with fiscal poli-
cies based on the polluter pays principle, according to our
data, the incentive comparatively decreases with increas-
ing car price.3 The effect of taxes on the price of fuels to
the choice of vehicles is technically very similar to that of
taxes on rated emissions, since the consumer, at purchase
time, can only at best estimate future fuel cost using man-
ufacturer rated emissions. Thus we treat them in the same
way here. Estimating their effectiveness however requires
extra knowledge, or assumptions, on the extent to which
consumers evaluate and take consideration of fuel costs
over the vehicle’s lifetime in their purchasing decisions.
The effectiveness of policy in a diverse market is ex-
plained schematically in figure 2 a and b, in which two fic-
titious vehicle markets are illustrated using one circle per
vehicle model, of which the area scales with its number of
sales. In a., we have a market where exponentially more
expensive vehicles have on average proportionally higher
fuel consumption. Applying a fiscal policy based on engine
sizes or rated emissions is likely to lead to some emissions
reductions if consumers, when replacing a vehicle, attempt
to remain within a particular price bracket, as the work of
McShane et al. (2012) suggests they would. By seeking a
price reduction to compensate for the tax, consumers are
forced by available choice to pick in almost every case lower
emissions vehicles. In this case the policy effectiveness is
well defined, and is equal to the slope of the relationship.
Note that this effect also works in reverse: if their income
increases, consumers may seek higher price vehicles, which
in turn would have higher emissions. Note also that the
effectiveness value is independent of the shape of the cho-
sen relation between the tax value and rated emissions (i.e.
proportional or not).4
3Car prices increase exponentially for corresponding emissions
that increase linearly. At high car prices, emissions taxes become
comparatively small.
4Pigouvian and fuel taxes are proportional to emissions, but other
relationships, e.g. exponential, could also be used.
In b., we have a situation where no correlation exists
between emissions and price. In this case, the aggregate
impact of a fiscal policy on emissions is ambiguous and
could lead to uncertain changes in emissions. This is be-
cause there is a wide range of possible fuel economy val-
ues that consumers can access while attempting to choose
lower price vehicles to compensate for the tax. In this case
the policy effectiveness is itself ambiguous. Insight on the
effectiveness of policy can thus be obtained from a com-
bination of the strength of the correlation between prices
and emissions (the level of confidence that a response to
the policy would arise), and the slope of the relationship
itself (the strength of the response).
Meanwhile, emissions can also be influenced using poli-
cies supporting changes in engine technologies, such hybrid
or electric. Technological change could effectively reduce
emissions if alternative engine vehicle models have very
low emissions and if they are accessible to most consumers.
Currently, however, (see below) most markets do not of-
fer a very wide range of models, which may not have the
ability to capture the whole breadth of existing consumer
diversity, restricting their diffusion. The effectiveness of
subsidies will be determined by whether they help better
match new technologies to consumer tastes in market seg-
ments where they can be made attractive. This is depicted
schematically in panel c., where hypothetical price dis-
tributed sales for an alternative technology are shown (in
red) along with a typical sales distribution of conventional
vehicles. The range of the market that can be expected
to be affected by a policy, according to McShane et al.
(2012), is a restricted segment of the whole market. A
subsidy policy changes the market segment in which the
technology is being marketed. This restricted effective-
ness can be altered in the future if manufacturers succeed
in broadening market choice in order to cover more social
identity groups.
Finally, we may ask, is the analysis of the impact of a
tax on the price of fuels conceptually any different to that
for a tax on the price of vehicles proportional to emis-
sions? There is considerable controversy on how buyers
of new vehicles take consideration of fuel costs when tak-
ing a decision (e.g. Busse et al., 2013, OECD, 2010). In
the consumer’s perspective, a fuel tax applies later in time
than a tax on vehicle prices. There is no clear evidence to
support a claim that high emissions vehicles are scrapped
more quickly in situations of a high tax on fuels; it mostly
changes their trading value in second hand markets, but
they likely remain in the fleet (Busse et al., 2013). There
is evidence that fuel taxes lead to reductions of car use
and associated emissions (Busse et al., 2013), which orig-
inates from changes in lifestyles, transport modes, load
factors and economic impacts, but this subject is outside
of the scope of the present paper, which focuses on con-
sumer choices for new vehicles. Thus for our purposes, for
a similar tax value, a fuel tax influences the choice of new
vehicles in a similar way as a registration tax proportional
to emissions.
4
The extent to which consumers consider fuel costs when
choosing a vehicle can be expressed by how much they
discount future fuel costs, and the discount rate expresses
their time preference. The literature reports values from
around 5-10% (Busse et al., 2013) to 20, even 40% (OECD,
2010), depending how the measurement is done. We show
in the SI that fleet averaged lifetime fuel costs are most of
the time much lower than fleet averaged car prices. The
effectiveness of a tax on fuels, per percent of tax applied, is
proportionally lower than a tax on car prices proportional
to emissions, by the proportion that fuel costs make in
the total cost, which partly depends on the discount rate
chosen. Calculations using various rates are given in the
SI.
Vehicle markets, policy and consumer choices co-evolve
with time (e.g. Geels, 2006). It is thus understood that
the analysis presented is a present day picture which will
evolve as manufacturers, consumers and policies co-evolve.
While the market structure will likely change, the short
term analysis approach proposed here should remain valid.
2.3. Calculating the effectiveness of a fiscal policy
Given comprehensive market data, the likely effective-
ness of a fiscal policy given above can be calculated using
a regression. However, more detailed insight may be ob-
tained with a model of distributed choice dynamics. We
assume, as in the above, that when imposing a new tax on
the purchase of vehicles based on emissions, the response
of consumers will be to compensate the tax with a lower
vehicle cost. We define a symmetric probability distribu-
tion (in log scale) f(lnPi−lnPj+lnTj , σ), that determines
the approximate region in the (E, lnP ) plane where they
search the market. Pi is the price of vehicles i considered
before the tax comes into force, Pj is the price of vehi-
cles j that consumers decide to purchase instead once the
tax comes into force, however without the tax included,
and rj = Tj − 1 is the vehicle dependent tax rate applied
on models j based on their rated emissions Ej . σ is the
tolerance of consumers to price differences, as a fraction
of price, that we assume within 5 to 20%. Following Mc-
Shane et al. (2012), consumers who would, before the tax,
have purchased vehicle model i, their probability of choos-
ing model j instead will be proportional to the relative
popularity of model j, (it’s number of sales Nj):
Pi→j = Njf(lnPi − lnPj + lnTj)∑
kNkf(lnPi − lnPk + lnTk)
. (1)
Before the tax was applied, Ni consumers per unit time
purchased model i. After the tax is applied, these con-
sumers will most likely purchase other models instead,
while other consumers from another price tier will pur-
chase model i. Since there were Ni consumers initially
considering model i, the number of consumers changing
their choice from i to j is thus
∆Ni→j = NiNj
f(lnPi − lnPk + lnTk)∑
kNkf(lnPi − lnPk + lnTk)
∆t. (2)
Consumers who would have purchased model j also have a
non-zero probability of purchasing model i,5 ∆Nj→i. The
number of changes of choices between model i and j is
∆Nij = ∆Ni→j −∆Nj→i
= NiNj [gij(lnTi)− gji(lnTi)] ∆t, (3)
gij(lnTi) =
f(lnPi − lnPk + lnTk)∑
kNkf(lnPi − lnPk + lnTk)
. (4)
A new set of vehicle sales when the tax applies can be
calculated using
∑
j ∆Nij + Ni. Here, we are interested
in calculating the average emissions change related to
these change of choices. We therefore add up each choice
change’s impact on total fleet-year emissions:
∆E =
1
Ntot
∑
ij
Ej∆Nij , Ntot =
∑
i
Ni, (5)
The cumulative amount of registration tax applied and
paid associated to new choices is calculated differently
since the tax value is zero before the tax is applied:
lnT =
1
Ntot
∑
ij
(∆Nij +Ni) lnTj . (6)
lnT is approximately equal to an average tax rate r
between zero and one. The value obtained from the ratio
∆E/lnT gives the weighted average emissions reductions
per unit of average tax paid that result from consumer
choice.6
The breadth of the variations between individual
choices and the average ∆E/lnT is obtained using
δ∆E =
√〈∆E2〉 − 〈∆E〉2, where 〈〉 indicates a popula-
tion weighted average.7 This may be interpreted as an un-
certainty range; however note that it actually corresponds
to the standard deviation of a known distribution of indi-
vidual behaviour, while ∆E is its mean, with significant
amounts of variations cancelling in the aggregate. The
same calculation is done for engine sizes ∆S.
3. Data and results
Sales for new private passenger vehicles were obtained
from Marklines (2014) for all six countries except the UK,
for which a more detailed dataset was used for new vehicle
registrations from the registration agency DVLA (2012a).
Entries were matched, model by model, to various data
sources, all commercial websites, for vehicle price, en-
gine size and rated emissions: (Car Pages, 2012) (UK),
5Especially if the tax was negative, i.e. a subsidy; this equation
must be symmetric under changes of sign of lnTi.
6E.g. if ∆E/lnT = 40 gCO2/km, then for a 10% average tax one
obtains mean emissions reductions of 4 gCO2/km.
7We considered that variations on lnT are the same as those on
∆E, since the relationship between emissions and tax is exact, and
thus this uncertainty is not double-counted.
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Figure 3: Top two rows: Price distributions of 2012 vehicle sales for six countries on linear price axes with identical price scaling. Price
distributions of alternative engine technology vehicles are shown in pink (hybrid) and red (electric), multiplied by the amounts indicated in
the legends for legibility. Bottom two rows: Emissions distributions (main graphs) and engine size distributions (insets) of 2012 vehicle sales
for six countries on linear emissions and engine size axes with identical scaling. Similar distributions of hybrid engine technology vehicles
are shown in pink, multiplied by the amounts indicated in the legends for legibility (electric cars have no engine displacements or tailpipe
emissions).
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Fleet distribution properties
UK USA China India Japan Brazil
Avg 34285 25959 22826 8674 18317 20642
P (USD) Med 31520 23871 18970 6947 14968 16425
Std 18640 10570 16633 12418 11526 13770
Avg 1576 3026 1704 1220 1286 1527
S (cc) Med 1498 2550 1596 1170 1252 1558
Std 544 1225 481 445 728 458
Avg 123.3 185.4 154.1 140.4 113.4 112.2
E (g/km) Med 118.8 175.6 152.5 145.0 102.2 105.6
Std 30.1 50.3 30.6 26.6 44.3 28.5
Table 1: Properties of vehicle fleets for six representative countries. This includes average (Avg), median (Med) and standard deviations
(Std) of prices, engine sizes and emissions. Price distributions are well described by log-normal, and thus their medians are lower than the
means.
AutoUSA.com (2013) (USA), SohuAuto (2014) and Au-
toHome (2014) (China), Zigwheels (2013) and CarWale
(2013) (India), and individual car maker websites. For
almost all models matched, we thus obtained their price,
rated emissions, engine size and the number sold from the
combination of only two data sources by model, enabling
to look for correlations. We matched in this way over 4200
models across the six nations.8
Prices were converted from local currencies to US dollars
using www.XE.com (June 2014). Rated emissions and en-
gine sizes are those given by the manufacturers. Marklines
(2014) numbers were checked for reliability against total
sales given by a number of official data sources, and proved
to be reliable. We stress that Marklines data are com-
prehensive in these countries, not samples. Variations of
prices for particular models related to optional features
were found to remain most of the time within about 5-
20% of the basic model prices, providing a rough basis for
the value of σ.
Figure 3 shows distributions of private passenger vehicle
prices on linear price axes for 2012 registrations in our six
major economies. Sales of alternative technologies, hybrid
and electric cars, are shown in pink and red respectively,
scaled up for legibility. All graphs have identical abscissa
scaling and binning for comparison. All distributions can
be parameterised by log-normal distributions.9 We pro-
vide average and median prices with their standard devia-
82212 in the UK, 470 in the USA, 630 in China, 188 in India,
455 in Japan, 335 in Brazil. All data sets cover all types of private
passenger vehicles with 4 wheels (i.e. we excluded buses and motor-
cycles). Where numbers of models are higher, such as in the UK,
more variants of similar models were included. In the UK, the DVLA
(2012a) database for new registrations has over 29 000 entries, fea-
turing large numbers of entry variants of similar or identical models.
In the UK the matching was restricted to entries with sales of more
than 100 units, however for other countries, all Marklines data was
used.
9This was determined by both binning the distributions on a log
axis and observing distributions that are roughly normal, and by
fitting non-linearly log-normal distributions to the data with linear
binning, not shown here.
tions in Table 1. The distributions of emissions and engine
sizes for the same data are also shown in figure 3, with en-
gine sizes in the insets. Average and median emissions and
engine sizes, with their standard deviations, are given in
Table 1.
Scatter plots with linear univariate correlations between
engine sizes and the logarithm of vehicle prices are shown
in the left hand panels of figures 4 and 5. The same is
given for emissions and engine sizes, middle panels, and
for emissions and the logarithm of prices, in the right hand
panels. In these bubble graphs, one circle is shown per
model, of which the area is scaled with the root of the
number of sales.2 The same circle size scaling was used
in all graphs. Lines are population weighted linear fits
of two variables, with coefficients of determination R2 in-
dicated (all parameters given in Table 2). We did not
assume that emissions were correlated with engine sizes
and prices simultaneously (the regressions are not multi-
variate); instead we considered that emissions depend on
vehicle prices exclusively through the relationship between
emissions and engine sizes. Uncertainty values on regres-
sions were obtained using a Monte-Carlo method (details
in the SI).
Table 2 gives correlations parameters and effectiveness
values (∆E/lnT ) calculated using eqns. 5 and 6, for both
types of vehicle tax schemes based either on emissions or
engine sizes. The effectiveness values per unit of aver-
age tax paid were calculated using three values of con-
sumer tolerance to price changes σ, with uncertainty, over
a range of 42 tax schemes proportional to emissions or en-
gine sizes, with values of between -3kUSD up to 20kUSD
at 300 gCO2/km, for taxes on emissions, and between -
3 up to 20kUSD/cc at 5000cc for taxes on engine sizes.
The negative ranges were included to test whether nega-
tive taxes lead to higher emissions, which effectively leads
2The root was used for illustrative purposes, to increase the vis-
ibility of less popular models and to limit the area of circles for
popular models. This enabled the same scaling to be used in all
graphs.
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Figure 4: Population weighted univariate regressions between variables for the UK, USA and China. Left column: engine sizes against the
logarithm of vehicle prices. Middle column: Emissions against engine sizes. Right column: Emissions against the logarithm of vehicle prices.
to the same but negative effectiveness values (see details
in the SI). This indicates that increases in relative income
leads consumers to choose higher emissions vehicles by the
same scaling parameter. The effectiveness of a fuel tax,
since it is very similar to a registration tax proportional to
emissions, is explored in the SI, however since when includ-
ing fuel costs in consumer decisions, this tax is expressed in
terms of a smaller component of the total operating cost,
the effectiveness value obtained is proportionally smaller.3
Finally, long term impacts of fiscal policies supporting
low carbon engine technologies at low levels of diffusion is
difficult to carry out using this short term analysis: it re-
quires modelling diffusion dynamics. Here we find however
that in the short term, emissions were not always reduced
3I.e. this only means that a doubling of the price of fuels has a
smaller effectiveness than a tax of which the fee results in a doubling
of the average price of the vehicles.
in the model when subsidising the purchase of hybrid cars
since the policy may actually lead consumers to replace
low carbon petrol and diesel vehicles by higher emissions
hybrids. This depends strongly on the specific details of
the policy, which needs more careful study. Meanwhile,
subsidising electric cars in all cases decreases emissions,
but by amounts orders of magnitude lower than the values
of table 2 in which all types of vehicles are involved.
4. Discussion
4.1. Distributions
We observe that the structures of vehicle markets are
widely different across countries. Within developed na-
tions, while the price distribution in the UK is compara-
ble to that of the USA, the distribution in Japan is lower
and narrower. For the emerging nations, in India and
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Figure 5: Population weighted univariate regressions between variables for India, Japan and Brazil. Left column: engine sizes against the
logarithm of vehicle prices. Middle column: Emissions against engine sizes. Right column: Emissions against the logarithm of vehicle prices.
In the case of Brazil, flex indicates cars that can use either petrol or ethanol.
Brazil the distributions are narrow and similar to that of
Japan, while the distribution in China is broad, compa-
rable to that in the UK. This is likely related to income
distribution, culture and social dynamics within those so-
cieties. These variations do not have any clear relationship
to GINI coefficients for these countries or other measures
of inequality.4
We also find disparities between distributions of engine
sizes across nations, seemingly unrelated to any particu-
lar physical or geographical features or constraints. These
are unrelated to differences in price distributions. For ex-
ample, despite similar price distributions in the UK and
the USA, the distribution of engine sizes in the USA cov-
4While a relationship with income distribution apparently exists
(as suggested by figure 1), the relationship with inequality is likely
more complex.
ers 1000 to 6000cc, while that of the UK is concentrated
between 1000 and 3000cc.
We find similar disparities across countries in the distri-
butions of rated emissions. Cars in the USA have the
broadest emissions distribution, while Brazil and India
have the narrowest, followed by the UK and Japan. The
USA has the highest average and median emissions, while
Brazil and Japan have the lowest. The upper end of the
emissions distribution in the USA has a value of almost
twice that in Brazil or India, and 50% higher than the UK
and Japan. These market structure differences are identi-
fied as tied to cultural and behavioural characteristics of
consumers, but also tied to their regulatory and tax his-
tory (including fuel taxes, which are markedly lower in the
USA).
Price distributions of alternative technologies are also
very different across countries. The UK is the nation with
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the widest choice for hybrid cars while it is the USA for
electric cars. Japan sees the highest market penetration in
absolute numbers for both, however these cover only about
the upper half of the price range. The availability and
penetration of alternative technologies in emerging nations
is very low, and in India and Brazil the price of hybrid
vehicles is prohibitively higher than what people spend on
vehicles. This means that in the USA and the UK, most
consumers can access an alternative vehicle technology in
price ranges near what they are willing to pay for a vehicle.
Meanwhile this is not the case in emerging countries where
the market coverage of these technologies is very patchy.
Japan is in an intermediate situation. This limits highly
the effectiveness of alternative technology support policies
such as subsidies.
The emissions distributions of hybrid vehicles have lower
averages than those of ICE vehicles. However their emis-
sions are not always lower than the fleet-year averages,
where for example in the USA, many hybrid vehicles have
higher emissions than most petrol cars. A similar observa-
tion can be made about Japan and the UK. As the avail-
ability of technologies in these countries is comparatively
high, this feature correlates with the fact that emissions
of hybrid vehicles sold to consumers purchasing in large
engine size brackets are higher than emissions of any ve-
hicles in lower engine power brackets; however emissions
of high power hybrids are still lower than those of the ve-
hicles they most likely replace in the same price or engine
size brackets. It suggests that subsidising hybrid vehicles
can lead to increased emissions.
4.2. Correlations and policy effectiveness
Correlations between emissions and engine sizes exist
in all countries, and this is due to this relationship being
mostly an engineering one (figures 4 and 5, middle panels,
and Table 2, middle columns), where larger engines are
more powerful, use more energy (fuel) and therefore pro-
duce higher emissions per distance driven. The parameters
of these correlations are similar but differ across countries,
and this may be related to either or both: (1) additional
features coming with higher power vehicles that also use
energy, of which the purchase differ between countries, or
(2) different levels of technology sophistication in vehicles
leading to varying levels of fuel efficiency at similar engine
sizes.
However, correlations do not always exist between prices
and engine sizes (or power, left panels). Their strength
(the R2 parameters), when they exist, vary considerably
between countries. In particular, while a very clear log-
linear relationship exists in the UK, India, Japan and
Brazil, the relationships are very weak in the USA and
China. This indicates a clear hierarchy between engine
size and prices in vehicle markets in the UK, India, Japan
and Brazil, but none in the USA or China. It thus emerges
that in China and the USA, the size of the engine is not a
major determinant of the price in manufacturer marketing
decisions, while it is elsewhere.
Depending whether relationships exist between prices
and engine sizes, the existing relationships between emis-
sions and engine sizes bridges to possible relationships be-
tween emissions and prices, although with weaker correla-
tions than with engine sizes. Thus, wherever relationships
exist between engine sizes and prices, they exist between
emissions and prices, and conversely where they don’t ex-
ist. Thus very weak relationships exist between emissions
and prices in the USA and China, while they are stronger
in other countries.
The scaling parameters of these relationships (Table 2)
indicate the likely consumer response to fiscal policy in
these countries, with a confidence measure given by R2.
However, we consider that more reliable values, along with
measures of variations in consumer behaviour, are given
by using the average effectiveness of policy per average
unit tax paid determined using eqns. 5 and 6. According
to these, one expects a high response to policy of 0.6 to
0.9 gCO2/km per percent of average tax in the USA (60-
90 gCO2/km for 100% tax), indicating a very high abate-
ment potential with moderate tax values. Meanwhile in
all other countries, the fleet-year-average effectiveness lies
in the area of 0.3-0.4 gCO2/km per percent of average
tax. These values agree with those obtained with regres-
sions. It has been suggested that indirect emissions taxes
based on engine sizes are less efficient at reducing emissions
than direct taxes (He and Bandivadekar, 2011). From the
consumer choice perspective, this is not supported by our
data, where little difference is observed in aggregate be-
tween the two tax schemes. Therefore, this assertion is
likely to be only true from the supplier perspective, where
manufacturers are likely to attempt to circumvent engine
size-based taxes by designing vehicles with smaller engines
for the same amount of power (e.g. with turbo-chargers).
Negative tax values also lead to increases in emissions
by the same factors, suggesting that relative consumer in-
come increases lead to increasing emissions. This can ex-
plain current trends of increase in engine sizes in the UK,5
Ireland (Gallachoir et al., 2009) and Germany Zachariadis
(2013). Finally, the effectiveness of taxes are orders of
magnitude higher in the short term than those obtained
when policy only supports the diffusion of alternative en-
gine technologies with subsidies.
5. Conclusion and policy implications
The data and analysis presented in this paper has clear
policy implications. We have provided qualitative and
quantitative tools that can help understand and determine
the likely outcome of chosen policies targeting consumer
vehicle choice for emissions reductions. We find that it is
possible to calculate average values for the effectiveness of
fiscal policies using market data, and the results differ by
5Our data, not shown here.
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Correlation parameters
Engine size vs log Price Emissions vs Engine Size Emissions vs log Price
a1 b2 R2 a3 b4 R2 a5 b6 R2
UK Petrol 1145 -9581 0.73 48.87 61.3 0.84 60.8 -453.2 0.71
Diesel 1118 -9395 0.74 50.6 33.9 0.52 65.1 -527.5 0.50
Hybrid 1605 -14314 0.85 31.2 39.2 0.67 52.0 -427.3 0.63
All 1089±76 -9072±785 0.76 40±4 64±6 0.56 43±6 -314±57 0.42
USA Petrol 1755 -14747 0.15 35.2 90.2 0.53 72.7 -545.2 0.26
Hybrid 1868 -16929 0.84 39.5 50.7 0.93 85.6 -738.0 0.84
All 1751±333 -14742±3357 0.13 36±9 87±21 0.54 73±21 -545±207 0.23
China Petrol 333 -1578 0.32 43.8 84.6 0.40 17.9 -17.6 0.17
Diesel 259 -623 0.31 97.9 -19.2 0.31 36.2 -148.9 0.14
Hybrid 456 -2976 0.05 23.7 51.6 0.40 -44.6 573.4 0.42
All 331±120 -1560±1178 0.32 43±11 84±21 0.40 18±7 -66±67 0.17
India Petrol 673 -4847 0.91 21.3 121.0 0.27 19.6 -29.2 0.29
Diesel 794 -5796 0.63 26.9 120.2 0.40 31.9 -131.8 0.52
All 790±273 -5828±2455 0.75 28±25 116±39 0.40 30±24 -114±218 0.45
Japan Petrol 1308 -11466 0.84 47.8 67.2 0.78 56.7 -422.4 0.55
Hybrid 1286 -11098 0.58 47.8 4.5 0.72 74.4 -653.8 0.75
All 1333±210 -11693±2051 0.84 41±14 67±14 0.67 50±20 -349±/87 0.49
Brazil Petrol 887 -7130 0.62 17.2 118.8 0.31 33.6 -194.6 0.41
Flex fuel 838 -6777 0.60 32.4 68.1 0.36 33.1 -211.6 0.37
All 964±187 -7980±1875 0.84 35±18 67±24 0.73 42±16 -328±157 0.76
Tax effectiveness ∆E
lnT
and ∆S
lnT
Tax on emissions
Emissions reductions (in gCO2/km) Engine size reductions (in cc)
σ = .05 σ = .1 σ = .2 σ = .05 σ = .1 σ = .2
UK 32 ± 15 32 ± 11 31 ± 8 781 ± 157 780 ± 118 775 ± 92
USA 93 ± 52 82 ± 42 64 ± 30 2128 ± 673 1941 ± 552 1465 ± 406
China 25 ± 22 25 ± 19 21 ± 14 327 ± 231 294 ± 214 263 ± 167
India 38 ± 57 37 ± 48 32 ± 36 717 ± 389 637 ± 331 549 ± 261
Japan 26 ± 39 34 ± 28 35 ± 18 859 ± 384 874 ± 278 884 ± 222
Brazil 33 ± 86 32 ± 69 26 ± 32 820 ± 902 748 ± 746 584 ± 381
Tax on engine size
UK 33 ± 12 33 ± 9 33 ± 8 858 ± 139 861 ± 112 870 ± 103
USA 83 ± 56 78 ± 44 64 ± 32 2361 ± 745 2156 ± 613 1682 ± 460
China 25 ± 25 23 ± 19 21 ± 12 265 ± 263 276 ± 211 302 ± 148
India 26 ± 93 22 ± 67 17 ± 45 781 ± 664 731 ± 475 623 ± 347
Japan 26 ± 42 36 ± 26 38 ± 23 1155 ± 470 1208 ± 318 1206 ± 302
Brazil 34 ± 77 35 ± 60 29 ± 32 965 ± 850 834 ± 656 658 ± 374
Table 2: (Top table) Table of correlation parameters, of the form y = ax+ b, calculated using the data of figure 4 and 5. Units are in (a1) (cc
= cubic centimetres, L = litres) cc / log P, (b2) cc, (a3) gCO2/km/L, (b4) gCO2/km, (a5) gCO2/km/log P and (b6) gCO2/km. R2 indicates
coefficients of determination expressing the strengths of the correlations. Uncertainty values for correlation parameters were obtained using
Monte-Carlo analysis, described in the SI. (Bottom table) Calculated values for the effectiveness of taxes on either rated emission or engine
sizes are given, with their aggregate impacts on both rated emissions and engine sizes for new potential fleet-years. These are calculated
using eqns. 5 and 6, i.e. emissions or engine size reductions expected for 100% tax applied (see calculation details with examples in the SI).
Uncertainty ranges correspond to the standard deviations of variations in individual consumer choices with respect to the means. They should
not be interpreted strictly as uncertainty values on the means, since significant amounts of variations in consumer choices cancel out in the
aggregate, even when their variations are significant.
country analysed. Our data show a high diversity of con-
sumer choices, tied to socio-economic differences, different
in every country, with repercussions on fleet-year emissions
and prospects for reductions.
The effectiveness of fiscal policies for incentivising con-
sumer choices towards lower emissions vehicles of any type,
according to this work, is of around 0.3-0.4 gCO2/km per
percent of a proportional emissions tax applied to vehi-
cle sale prices, in all countries except in the USA where
it is of 0.6-0.9 gCO2/km per percent of tax, 2 to 3 times
higher, with higher uncertainty. Taxes based on either
emissions or engine sizes have similar impacts. However,
using on their own policies to support the diffusion of new
engine technologies, given our model of consumer choice,
has an effectiveness orders of magnitude lower than tax
policies that apply to all types of vehicles simultaneously.
Fuel taxes, while reducing transport use, have a similar
effect on vehicle choices; however since they only apply to
a minor component of total costs, they result in a lower
impact. These values, however, apply only in the short
term. In the long term, the choice of consumers will influ-
ence manufacturer marketing strategy, which will alter the
range of vehicles offered to consumers, which will in turn
again alter consumer choices, and policy will need to be
re-assessed over time. The complex co-evolutionary pro-
cess between consumer choices, manufacturer strategy and
policy-making is a subject that requires further research.
We conclude that both the stringency and the structure
of policies are important. Fiscal policies based on emis-
sions are essential to reduce fleet-year emissions across the
range of consumer groups; policies supporting changes in
engine types are not likely highly effective in the short
term, and this is due to a patchy market coverage by hy-
brid and electric vehicles. Meanwhile, we show that fiscal
policies following the ‘polluter pays’ principle generate an
incentive that decreases with consumer income. If, in order
to completely decarbonise private transport (e.g. the UK’s
2050 target), policy strategy is to transform the market
towards a dominance of alternative technologies, compre-
hensive technology demand pull and supply push policies
must be used in close collaboration with manufacturers,
which may yield positive results in the long term. How-
ever, both emissions-based fiscal policies and technology
policies must be used simultaneously in order to reduce
emissions in both the short and the long term.
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Supplementary Information
1. Details of the calculation in the base case
We provide example calculations of the effectiveness of policy given the dataset for six vehicle year-fleets of the main
paper. We create various fictitious emissions taxing schemes and apply them to all vehicle prices according to their
emissions. We assume that from year to year, choices within social groups do not change significantly, i.e. that without
policy, choices next year would be the same as those observed in our dataset (e.g. the same lognormal distributions of
prices). We furthermore assume that choices do change with policy such that consumers seek other vehicle models that
cost approximately what they were initially intending to spend, i.e. they search in the vicinity of the market segment
their social group is accustomed to (e.g. economic, mid-range or luxury, and sub-segments within that) in a price region
that remains constant. Here we exclude fuel costs, which are treated in the next section.
Since they are not likely to find a vehicle at exactly the same price as they were initially planning to spend (i.e. our
vehicle market is discrete, not continuous), they may have to accept a certain price difference, and for this we assume
that they have a tolerance of σ. The introduction of σ enables to further relax assumptions about choices of social groups
by making choices broader, including consumers keeping the same purchase plan and paying the full tax. We initially
assign to σ a flexible value of 0.1, i.e. 10% of the price. We subsequently vary this value as a sensitivity analysis using
5% and 20%. Note that since this price comparison is carried out in log space, what we are assuming is that the order
of magnitude of the price remains the same before and after the tax within σ6, and thus this is not a highly constraining
assumption.
We follow the equations of Appendix A and present here graphs of results for these calculations. In principle, any
tax scheme can be tested with these equations; in this particular case we test a case where the tax value, i.e. the fee,
increases proportionally with rated vehicle emissions, consistent with a typical Pigouvian tax on emissions.7 We then
vary the magnitude of the scaling of this tax. New prices (after tax) in terms of old prices (before tax), when expressed
in log form (here ri = Ti − 1 ' lnTi is a tax rate, but in principle need not be a fraction of the vehicle price), are thus
logPj ' logPi + log Ti. (S.7)
We assume for simplicity that the relative probability of choice between two vehicles at slightly different prices away
from the centre value of the choice price follows a normal distribution in log scaling (i.e. a lognormal probability), i.e.
f(lnPi − lnPj + lnTj) = 1√
2piσ
exp
(
− (lnPi − lnPj + lnTj)
2
2σ2
)
. (S.8)
This essentially means that vehicle options for which eq. S.7 is not approximately true within σ are highly improbable
(undesirable to the consumer). The top left panel of figure S.3 shows 42 scenarios of tax based on emissions. The tax is
proportional to emissions rated by the manufacturer using a standard driving cycle, measured in tons of carbon dioxide
per kilometre.
According to eq. S.7, consumers intending to purchase a vehicle before the tax at price lnPi will, after the tax, seek
a vehicle in price band lnPj ± σ. Thus while carrying out the calculation, we may explore these choices by charting
using distributions of consumer choices in price and emissions space. This is given in figure S.1, where we chose one
of the taxing schemes above where the value of the registration tax at 300gCO2/km is $10k. Bars below zero indicate
price/emissions ranges where sales have decreased, and above zero where sales have increased. These histograms thus
represent the changes on the fleet-year that result from the tax according to our model.
New choice of vehicles lead in most cases to choices of vehicles with lower emissions ratings. This would strictly always
be the case if the correlations between E and lnP had a coefficient of determination R2 = 1. Due to scatter in the
data, this does not happen, and thus there always exist cases where the choice of vehicles at new prices before tax lower
than old prices (Pj < Pi) leads to new emissions higher than old emissions (Ej > Ei), although this might not be the
majority of cases. This means that there are instances where consumers are able to save money (i.e compensate the tax)
with choices that increase emissions.
Resulting emissions reductions averaged across the fleet-years, for 42 tax scenarios, as functions of the tax value are
given in figure S.2, along with the tax paid by consumers also averaged across the fleet-years, for three values of the
6E.g. in this scheme, it would be difficult to find a credible tax regime that would convince buyers of $100k vehicles to purchase $10k
vehicles.
7As argued in the main paper, in such a scheme, the incentive for reductions to high price bracket consumers declines with price, since the
tax increases linearly with emissions, while as we know from the data, the price rises exponentially with emissions. This, however, does not
change the method of the calculation or the result, which is expressed in average emissions reductions per unit of average tax paid.
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Figure S.1: Changes in the fleet-year due to changes in choices related to a tax proportional to emissions, in this case of a value of 10kUSD
at 300 gCO2/km. (Top six panels) Changes expressed in terms of prices excluding the tax. Insets show changes in terms of engine sizes.
(Bottom six panels) Changes in terms of rated emissions.
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Figure S.2: (Left column) Emissions reductions averaged across the new fleet-years as functions of the tax applied (expressed as the value at
300 gCO2/km) for three values of the tolerance σ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2. (Right column) Tax rate paid by consumers averaged across the fleet for
the same tolerances.
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Figure S.3: (Top left) Value of 42 different registration tax scenarios. (Other panels) Calculation of the effectiveness of the tax for different
values of the tolerance σ of consumers to price differences.
tolerance σ. With this one can see how aggregate emissions reductions occur, as a result of a very high number of
underlying changes of choice from vehicle model to vehicle model. Meanwhile the average tax paid also results from
new choices that accommodate consumers. Here, the x-axis indicates the absolute value of the tax at 300 gCO2/km.
The value of the tax for other emissions bands can be calculated as a linear proportion, or taken from the first panel of
fig. S.3.
Average emissions reductions per average unit of tax rate paid are shown in fig. S.3 for three different values of the
tolerance for price differences σ. These graphs correspond to the ratio between the traces of figure S.2 for each country.
Without noise in the correlations and with perfect market coverage in the dataset, we expect in principle (from the
argument of section 2.2) that this quantity should be a constant equal to the slope of the E, lnP relationship, the
effectiveness of the fiscal policy.
We observe different behaviour of this quantity in different countries, and changes that relate to the value of the
tolerance. When using a low tolerance value, results appear noisy in countries where the data is more aggregated. For
example, our dataset features a choice between 2200 vehicle models in the UK, therefore a near to continuous price
distribution of choices, which enables to use a low tolerance (consumers more often find models available near the to
the amount they were hoping to spend). In this case, the effectiveness of the tax (emissions reductions per unit tax) is
nearly constant for any tax value, except at low values, where the calculation approaches a value of zero divided by zero
and small amplitude noise leads to a divergence instead of the expected null effectiveness at zero tax. We stress that the
UK dataset is formed by an ensemble of vehicle models each available in a good number of variants at slightly different
prices. While the DVLA dataset (see main paper) featured around 30k model variants, our price data featured over
8000 model variants, and our data matching between these was limited to 2200 evenly distributed models due to lack of
information over the exact correspondence of the others. We stress that the UK dataset only features more variants of
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Figure S.4: Monte Carlo analysis of parameter fit uncertainty for the slope of the E, lnP relationships in the data.
the same models than the other datasets, which are more aggregated under more generic model categories.
In cases of lower quality datasets, as it is the case for India, the data forces a concentration of choices to a small
granular set of highly popular vehicle models, and this choice is not entirely constant as function of the value of the
tax (lumpy jumps occur at particular tax values). It impossible to distinguish in our data between a lower diversity in
the Indian market or a lower resolution of information in the data collection. We observe however that increasing the
tolerance damps this effect, as one intuitively expects. Since we know that in reality, most vehicle models are likely
available at a wide number of possible price values depending on particular choices of vehicle options (as with the UK
dataset), with better data the calculation would most likely reach a stable value in every case.
Table S.3 presents values of the average effectiveness of policy per unit tax paid, as obtained from correlations
calculations of the main paper, and from the calculation carried out here, in this case for three values of σ of 0.05, 0.1
and 0.2. As σ increases, it is observed that the uncertainty generally tends to decrease. However the boundary values of
0.2 and 0.05 can perhaps be considered unlikely themselves. All values are consistent with the slopes of the correlations.
We consider that the results of the calculation given here are more accurate than the values of the correlations. We
thus observe that on average, the effectiveness of policy per average percentage point of tax applied on emissions is of
around 48 ± 34 gCO2/km per unit tax across countries. This means that at a tax of 100%, a reduction of emissions of
48 gCO2/km is expected to take place. However the USA has a much higher response value that the other countries.
Excluding america, the value becomes 30 ± 30 gCO2/km.
These values can be compared to those of the correlations calculated in the main paper. Correlations generate scaling
parameters which may be sensitive to the choice of data points within the dataset. In particular, correlations calculated
using the whole dataset may not always generate the same values as correlations carried out using subsets of the data.
In order to test this, simple Monte Carlo techniques can be used. Here, we calculated the correlation parameters 10
000 times using each time half the number of data existing points chosen randomly. From the outcomes, we carried out
statistics in order to determine the uncertainty over the scaling parameters. The frequency count of the outcomes are
given in figure S.4 for the case of the E, lnP relationship, from which we derived means and standard deviations. The
resulting uncertainty is given in table S.3 and in table 2 of the main text. The same was carried out for the other two
relationships, with results indicated in table 2 of the main text.
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Effectiveness values ∆E/ lnT
Correlation R2 Models Sales σ = .05 σ = .1 σ = .2 Avg.
UK 43±6 .42 2207 1.9M 33±15 32±11 31±8 32±11
USA 73±21 .23 188 13.0M 93±52 82±42 64±30 78±41
China 18±7 .17 464 11.1M 25±22 25±18 21±14 28±17
India 30±24 .45 81 2.7M 38±57 37±48 32±36 37±47
Japan 50±20 .49 236 4.9M 26±39 34±28 35±18 31±28
Brazil 42±16 .76 185 3.4M 33±86 32±69 26±32 31±62
Table S.3: Table of parameters and averages of calculation results for the effectiveness of policy. The correlation parameters (in units of
emissions reductions per unit tax, gCO2/km) and R2 parameters are the same as those given in the main paper (table 2). The numbers of
models correspond to subsets of the data for which values were available for the number of sales, their price, emissions ratings and engine size
simultaneously. The last three columns are values of the effectiveness of policy, averaged over all tax scenarios above $5k at 300gCO2/km, in
units of average emissions reductions per unit of average tax paid, calculated as described above using three values of the tolerance parameter
σ. Uncertainty values correspond to two standard deviations.
Lifetime fuel costs, using ρ = 15% and a life expectancy of 12 years.
Units UK USA China India Japan Brazil
Fuel prices $/L 2.17 0.97 1.37 1.25 2 1.39
Fuel prices $/tCO2 957.59 428.05 604.56 551.61 882.57 613.39
Dist. Travelled km/y 12104 12485 14145 23674 12961 28000
Yearly fuel cost $-km/y-gCO2 11.59 5.34 8.55 13.06 11.44 17.17∑
`(a)/(1 + ρ)a No Units 5.16 5.16 5.16 5.16 5.16 51.6
Avg Efficiency gCO2/km 123.3 185.4 154.1 140.4 113.4 112.2
Lifetime fuel cost $ 7374 5112 6800 9460 6693 9943
Avg veh. price $ 34285 25959 22826 8674 18317 20642
Fuel % of total cost % 18 16 23 52 27 33
Veh. % of total cost % 82 84 77 48 73 67
Fuel % of veh. cost % 22 20 30 109 37 48
Veh. % of Fuel cost % 465 508 336 92 274 208
Table S.4: Parameters of and results from the calculation of fuel costs at a discount rate of 15%
2. Including fuel costs to the calculation
Here we carry out the same calculation, with the addition of fuel costs. Fuel costs, from the consumer’s viewpoint at
the time of choosing a vehicle model, can only be estimated very approximately by using the rated emissions, or fuel
economy, of vehicles considered. However fuel costs arise during the lifetime of the vehicle, and their estimation, in the
modeller’s view of how consumers take decisions, requires us to know to which extent they take them into consideration.
The level at which consumers take these into consideration can also be expressed using a discount rate, which represents
the value of future expenditures at the time of decision. There is no clear consensus in the literature on how consumers
in the vehicle market consider fuel costs. This however, as we will see here, depends highly on social groups, since the
fraction of total costs made by future fuel costs varies significantly, which complicates the analysis.
Vehicles have a survival probability, of which consumers are aware at decision time. Vehicles are widely known to
survive, without accidents, between 10 and 20 years, and therefore it is not realistic to expect consumers to take account
of fuel costs much after of the life expectancy of 12 years. We denote the survival function `i(a), the probability of a
vehicle surviving to age a. If we assume that the consumer effectively uses a discount rate ρ to determine the present
value of future fuel costs when choosing a vehicle, then the lifetime fuel cost is
CFi =
∑
a
`i(a)di(a)P
F (a)Eiβi
(1 + ρ)a
, (S.9)
where di is the average yearly expected distance travelled with the vehicle considered, P
F are expected future fuel prices
(in $/L) and β a constant that scales the rated emissions value Ei, in gCO2/km, into a fuel economy in L/km. Using
survival data from the DVLA (2012a,b), average distances driven from Euromonitor International (2014), fuel prices
from the World Bank (2015), the value of this expression, in terms of the discount rate, is given in figure S.5, while all
values are given in table S.4 using a discount rate of 15%. Here we used constant 2012 values for fuel prices (i.e. as if
no changes were expected) and for distances travelled (i.e. same distances are expected to be travelled every year).
Using a total cost including discounted fuel costs in the calculation of the effectiveness of taxes opens up the possibility
of examining possible taxes on fuels as well as on vehicle registration (road taxes that are paid every year amount to
the same calculation as for fuel taxes unless we discount in smaller increments than yearly, which would yield a minute
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Figure S.5: Factor to rescale results in table S.4 when changing the base discount rate of 15%.
difference). However, after applying the discounting of eq. S.9, it does not require any differences in calculation than
what is given in the main text (section 2.3), using only a different scaling. In other words, if, as in the UK, fuel costs
account, on average, for 18% of total costs (table S.4), assuming that consumers value them with 15% discounting, then
the effectiveness of an average tax of 1% on fuels is 22% of the effectiveness of an average tax of 1% on car prices.
Table S.5 gives re-calculated effectiveness values when including fuel costs, using the same method as in the main paper.
Tax effectiveness ∆E
lnT
and ∆S
lnT
Emissions tax on registration
Emissions reductions (in gCO2/km) Engine size reductions (in cc)
σ = .05 σ = .1 σ = .2 σ = .05 σ = .1 σ = .2
UK 35 ± 12 34 ± 9 32 ± 7 786 ± 134 785 ± 105 762 ± 91
USA 87 ± 49 81 ± 36 67 ± 27 1980 ± 625 1793 ± 486 1351 ± 391
China 43 ± 18 36 ± 14 27 ± 12 496 ± 181 424 ± 159 364 ± 136
India 56 ± 63 40 ± 41 21 ± 21 401 ± 613 388 ± 376 288 ± 195
Japan 36 ± 35 40 ± 25 41 ± 17 955 ± 374 885 ± 255 819 ± 197
Brazil 35 ± 64 32 ± 45 28 ± 22 778 ± 708 654 ± 503 488 ± 252
Tax on the price of fuels
UK 7 ± 3 7 ± 2 7 ± 2 169 ± 29 169 ± 20 164 ± 20
USA 17 ± 10 16 ± 7 13 ± 5 390 ± 123 353 ± 77 266 ± 77
China 13 ± 5 11 ± 4 8 ± 4 148 ± 54 126 ± 40 108 ± 40
India 62 ± 69 44 ± 45 23 ± 23 438 ± 669 424 ± 212 314 ± 212
Japan 13 ± 13 15 ± 9 15 ± 6 349 ± 137 323 ± 72 299 ± 72
Brazil 17 ± 31 15 ± 22 13 ± 10 375 ± 341 315 ± 122 235 ± 122
Table S.5: Tax effectiveness values calculated using the equations of section 2.3 while integrating the cost of fuels of equation S.9, where the
tax in ∆E/ lnT refers to a tax on the vehicle price or on the price of fuels. When using a consumer discount rate of 15%, this gives specific
proportions of the total cost in the vehicle and fuel prices, as given in table S.4, but this can be easily changed using values in figure S.5 for
other discount rates. Values of effectiveness of a tax on fuels is proportionally lower by its contribution to the total cost, and similarly for
registration taxes on the vehicle price. For instance, if we were to use a discount rate of 2% (40%), the values of effectiveness of a tax on fuel
prices would be '2 times larger (' 0.5 times smaller), while the effect of a registration on the vehicle price would be scaled by 1−αβ, where
α is the value taken from figure S.5 and β is the contribution of fuel prices (row 9 of table S.4).
When comparing table S.5 with table 2 of the main paper, we find that a tax on the vehicle price based on emissions
is not changed significantly if we include fuel costs in the calculation of agents for their vehicle choice. Effectively, it
increases the total cost but the tax only applies to a fraction of that cost. This is the case for all countries where fuel
costs make a relatively small portion of all costs, i.e. all countries excluding China and India. In the latter, since fuel
costs make a higher proportion of total costs, the effectiveness of a tax on emissions is increased if we assume that
consumers consider the fuel costs in their choice with a discount rate of 15%. These values can be re-interpreted to other
discount rates by using the proportional scaling factor given in figure S.5 (i.e. the value can be ' 2 times larger at very
low discount rates, or ' 2 times smaller for very high discount rates).
We also find the effectiveness of that a tax on fuels at reducing emissions is generally much lower than a registration
tax of the same level, in percent of the price of the quantity taxed. In other words, a tax that on averages doubles
the price of vehicles is more effective than a tax that doubles the price of fuels by the factors given in the last row of
table S.4. This is due to the relative fractions of lifetime fuel costs relative to the car price. We stress, however, that
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there is no clear evidence of how consumers take consideration of fuel costs, and that the effectiveness of taxes on fuels
may be lower. Variations between countries in their respective taxes on fuels do, however, likely explain some of the
differences observed in the distributions of the fuel economy. They have helped increase with time the efficiency of the
fleets in countries where they have been higher (e.g. UK, Japan), where in some cases they are of over 100%. However,
registration taxes based on emissions could in principle be even more effective.
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